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Book Review
Ajay K. Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State: Law, Politics, and the Rise 
of Progressive Taxation, 1877-1929, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 
pp. 432, $78.
Reviewed by Steven A. Bank
Ajay Mehrotra is a leader of a new generation of tax historians and a pioneer 
in the field of fiscal sociology. Befitting his richly interdisciplinary training 
and acculturation, Mehrotra’s work is not merely a history of the tax laws, 
but an almost anthropological peek at the development of the nation’s fiscal 
architecture. Although others have written about the origins of the income tax 
from a variety of disciplinary perspectives,1 few are able to weave together the 
law, politics, sociology, and economics in the way he does.
In Making the Modern American Fiscal State, all of the best qualities of 
Mehrotra’s work are on display. The book is careful, nuanced, informative, 
and comprehensive, painting a detailed picture of how the revenue system 
was radically remade over this period from a system based upon the necessity 
to consume to a system based upon the ability to pay. In the early nineteenth-
century federal revenue system, which Mehrotra calls the Old Fiscal Order, 
America relied primarily upon regressive tariffs or customs duties to fund 
expenses at the national level. These were consumption taxes levied on 
products and goods imported into the country. 
As with consumption taxes generally, such as the modern retail sales tax 
levied by states and municipalities, tariffs were regressive in the sense that they 
disproportionately burdened those of modest means. Rather than being borne 
by foreign importers, tariffs were largely passed on to consumers in the form 
of higher prices. Although there were some luxury goods that were purchased 
primarily by wealthier customers, most customs duties were on staples that 
everyone bought directly or indirectly in other products, and consumption 
was distributed fairly evenly among economic groups. This meant that even if 
1. See, e.g., W. Elliot BroWnlEE, FEdEral taxation in amErica: a Short hiStory (2004) 
(economic history), richard J. JoSEph, thE originS oF thE amErican incomE tax:  thE 
rEvEnuE act oF 1894 and itS aFtErmath (2004) (law); John F. WittE, thE politicS and 
dEvElopmEnt oF thE FEdEral incomE tax (1985) (political science).
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everyone consumed roughly the same amount of a product and bore roughly 
the same nominal amount of the additional cost attributable to the customs 
duties, the percentage of a wealthy person’s income taken by such additional 
cost was far less than the percentage of a poorer person’s income. 
What compounded the regressivity of the tariff beyond that of a mere 
consumption tax is that tariffs effectively benefited wealthy domestic producers 
at the expense of consumers, the bulk of whom were decidedly lower on the 
socio-economic scale. In part, this was because the tariffs often were designed 
not to raise revenue, but rather to protect growing domestic industries 
against the competition from foreign imports. In theory, the protection did 
not have to drastically affect the price borne by consumers. The differential 
between domestic products and foreign imports as a result of the tariff simply 
should have driven consumers to buy the domestic products. That would 
have enriched domestic producers, which may have raised questions about 
the distribution of government power and largesse, but without seriously 
burdening consumers except perhaps as to choice and quality of the product 
purchased. In reality, though, tariffs enabled domestic producers to raise their 
prices to a point just below the tariff-driven rise in price for the comparable 
imported products. This meant that tariffs facilitated a windfall for domestic 
producers who were generally on the higher end of the income distribution, 
while levying a cost on consumers that was disproportionately felt by those who 
were of modest means. Moreover, as Mehrotra describes, opponents charged 
that tariffs exacerbated this regressive effect by removing competition and 
thereby facilitating “economic collusion and the concentration of corporate 
power in the form of trusts and other monopolies” (50). So, in the industries 
where tariffs offered protection to domestic concerns, the resulting drop in 
competition may have permitted those domestic manufacturers and producers 
to ultimately raise their prices even beyond that originally occasioned by the 
tariff.
Although Mehrotra is not the first to observe the revenue system’s shift away 
from the reliance on regressive tariff taxes toward more progressive income 
taxes, he provides a much richer picture of how it occurred. He describes 
how this transformation took place not just through legislative enactments, 
but also through academic discourse. As befitting someone steeped in the 
Elliot Brownlee tradition of economic history, Mehrotra devotes ample time 
to profiling the pioneering public finance economists whom he credits for 
this progressive transformation in academic theory, including Henry Carter 
Adams, Richard T. Ely, and Edwin R.A. Seligman (97-120). Perhaps his 
greatest contribution is in the book’s detailed description of the centralization 
of fiscal authority and the concomitant development of the administrative 
apparatus to operate the new system (293-348).
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One might be tempted, however, in the wake of Thomas Piketty’s tome 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century,2 to ask whether the transformation Mehrotra 
describes actually accomplished very much. Piketty did find a reduction in 
inequality between 1910 and 1950 that roughly parallels the growth in the 
progressive income tax that Mehrotra describes, but he similarly observed 
a “resurgence of inequality after 1980 . . . due largely to the political shifts 
of the past several decades, especially in regards to taxation and finance.”3 
The implication is that while Mehrotra may have described a transformative 
period in American finance, it was one that was rolled back in the latter half 
of the twentieth century. This is something that Mehrotra foreshadows in his 
description of the post-World War I period, when the rise of Republican fiscal 
policy under Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon led to a rapid and drastic 
decline in the high graduated rates that had been enacted during the war (396-
404).
Moreover, some observers of taxation during this period question whether 
the reduction in inequality during the first half of the century had much to do 
at all with the introduction of the income tax. Piketty attributed it primarily to 
the First and Second World Wars and the policies adopted in association with 
the war effort and subsequent recovery.4 The advent of a system of pension 
payments for Civil War veterans has been described as similarly important 
to the creation of a social welfare state,5 although it is fair to conclude that its 
stability was at least partly attributable to the revenue from income taxation.
Others have gone further in dismissing the progressive origins of the 
income tax. Political scientist Robert Stanley, writing about the income tax’s 
beginnings during the Civil War and continuing through the ratification of 
the Sixteenth Amendment and the adoption of the first modern income tax,6 
described the tax as counterrevolutionary. According to Stanley, “income 
taxation was invoked to forestall dissent against the course of centrism during 
times of economic crisis.”7 As Stanley pointed out, the income tax did little to 
redistribute wealth. The income tax levied a one percent normal charge and 
up to a six percent surcharge.8 This was a far cry from the rates advocated by 
progressives at the time the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax was 
adopted in 1913, with Representative Ira Copley’s proposal for a top surtax rate 
2. thomaS pikEtty, capital in thE tWEnty-FirSt cEntury (Arthur Goldhammer, trans. 
2014).
3. Id. at 20.
4. Id. at 20, 396-98.
5. StEvEn r. WEiSman, thE grEat tax WarS 176 (2002).
6. roBErt StanlEy, dimEnSionS oF laW in thE SErvicE oF ordEr:  originS oF thE FEdEral 
incomE tax, 1861-1913 (1993).
7. Id. at 13.
8. 38 Stat. 166 (1913); see also SidnEy ratnEr, taxation and dEmocracy in amErica 333-6 
(1980).
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of sixty-eight percent falling on deaf ears.9 Moreover, the thresholds for the 
adopted rates were quite limited, with the normal rate applying to individual 
incomes in excess of $3000 and the top rate applying only when incomes 
exceeded $20,000.10 This was at a time when the mean adult male income was 
estimated to be $578,11 making the income tax essentially inapplicable to the 
vast majority of the population and the top rates applicable to an exceedingly 
small circle of people. Three-tenths of one percent of the population had to 
pay the tax in 1916, which amounted to a mere one percent of the workforce.12 
Furthermore, the income tax revenues constituted only 11.5 percent of federal 
revenues in 1915, which was more of a reflection of the decline of tariff revenues 
due to the onset of World War I in Europe than a higher burden for the upper 
class.13 From Stanley’s perspective, all the income tax did was to acquiesce 
the masses that might have otherwise seized the opportunity presented by 
economic instability to revolt as they did against czarist Russia.
In Making the Modern American Fiscal State, Mehrotra responds to Stanley and 
other New Left legal historians by focusing on the permanent shift in the 
base of taxation ushered in during this period. Mehrotra maintained that “[t]
he dramatic shift from a regressive, hidden, disaggregated, and politicized 
tax system to a graduated, transparent, and centrally and professionally 
administered one was a tremendous achievement” (27). The stability of the 
new fiscal order developed incrementally through accretion rather than 
dramatically through a particular court decision or legislative enactment, 
but it was no less permanent. According to Mehrotra, “[t]his transformation 
may not have gone as far as some dissent activists, theorists, and legislators 
had hoped, but it ultimately laid the foundation for a revolution in American 
fiscal relations. The idea that this was purely a palace revolution . . . provides 
only a partial accounting of a considerably more complex and consequential 
historical moment” (27). Mehrotra might have extended his study through 
World War II, when the tax fully assumed its place as the most important 
source of federal revenues,14 to better make his point, but he does convincingly 
establish that the income tax became entrenched by 1929.
Although Stanley’s revisionism likely goes too far in rejecting the 
progressive nature of the move to income taxation, what may be lost in 
Mehrotra’s defense of the momentous nature of the transformation is the 
extent to which the progressivism involved in the shift was more contextual, 
political, and contingent than the rhetoric might suggest. There were certainly 
those who envisioned a radically redistributive type of progressive taxation, 
9. 50 cong. rEc. 1246 (1913) (statement of Rep. Copley); ratnEr, supra note 8 at 328, n. 15.
10. 38 Stat. 166, 167 (1913); StanlEy, supra note 6 at 249-50.
11. StanlEy, supra note 6, at 249.
12. Id. at 250.
13. Id. 
14. StEvEn a. Bank, kirk J. Stark & JoSEph J. thorndikE, War and taxES 84 (2008).
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but they weren’t exactly the winners in this debate. Arguably, the winning 
theory of income taxation was one that is hardly ever discussed today and is 
not mentioned in Making the Modern American Fiscal State—one Edwin Seligman 
called in 1908 the “special compensatory theory.”15 This was distinguished 
from the general compensatory theory, which posited that the income tax 
was necessary to offset “the inequalities consecrated by custom and by law” 
whereby “the legal conditions of society naturally favor the rich.”16 Under 
the special compensatory theory, the revenue system is viewed as a whole and 
one form of taxation is made progressive to make up for the regressive effects 
of another specific form of taxation. According to Seligman, the income tax 
and other similar direct taxes are “designed to act as an engine of reparation” 
against the regressivity of the customs duties and excise taxes.17 “In order to 
attain equal treatment,” Seligman wrote, “regressive indirect taxes,” must be 
counterbalanced by the progressive direct tax.”18 
It’s not that Mehrotra ignores this part of the story. For example, he explains 
that in 1894 “[income] tax advocates . . . reminded their opponents that the 
proposed income tax was merely a supplement to a larger tariff regime, and 
that national taxation was just one part of a broader fiscal order that included 
many forms of regressive taxat[ion].” (128). But Mehrotra characterizes this 
as a mere political compromise that served as a weigh station on the road to 
the true progressivity of an income-centric tax system, rather than being a part 
of the design itself. Instead, it may be better understood as a view that the 
base and the rates of an income tax could ratchet up or down based on the 
makeup of the remainder of the system. Indeed, during the debates over the 
first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax bill in 1913, Senator John Sharp 
Williams, the leader of the Democratic caucus, argued that “when the good 
day comes—the golden day—when there will be no taxes upon consumption at 
all . . . and no import duties at all except countervailing duties to offset them… 
[then] everybody will pay in proportion to his income,” which, in effect meant 
a flat rate.19 The transformation Mehrotra describes was important and it was 
progressive (in no small part due to the advance of fiscal citizenship that is one 
of the book’s themes), but it was not necessarily designed to lead to progressive 
income taxation in the sense of steeply graduated marginal rates.
Perhaps this is why the “retrenchment” Mehrotra describes in the 1920s was 
less a retreat from the principles of progressivity and more a reflection of the 
return to the mean for income taxation in its service as a mild counterbalance 
to the continued presence of regressive features, including, in more modern 
times, the regressivity arising from the unequal distribution of tax evasion 
opportunities and from the wage taxes that disproportionately burden the 
15. EdWin r.a. SEligman, progrESSivE taxation in thEory and practicE 146 (1908).
16. Id. at 144 (quoting French writer Nicolas Villiaumé).
17. Id. at 146.
18. Id.
19. 50 cong. rEc. 3841 (1913) (statement of Sen. Williams).
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lower and middle classes. In many respects, the fundamentally moderate 
or even conservative underpinnings of the original income tax continues to 
describe the tax laws and frustrate reformers, including those who see Piketty’s 
description of the rise of inequality as a clarion call for new forms of wealth 
taxation. Nevertheless, the fundamental point driven home by Mehrotra’s 
Making the Modern American Fiscal State is that the brilliance of the federal revenue 
system is its ability to accommodate more progressive reforms, even if the 
political will may not currently exist to adopt them.
